


Procession from Burgundy reaches Macy's New York



In 1933, Macy's Famous Taster, suddenly hailed by a Frenchman, drew up alongside the Dijon-Beaune highway in Burgundy. The hailer was an ancient friend, unmet for 15 years. "My old!" he cried. "You're no chicken yourself," replied the Taster, and ducked a kiss.

The result of this chance meeting was the building up of one of New York's most notable family of Burgundies, called Marceau. At Macy's only.

The ancient friend guided the Taster in turn to six successive and famous vineyards and vintners—men whose forebears had been making rare Burgundy since Charlemagne's time in A. D. 775—which is plenty long enough to learn an art.

The rarest—choicest, perhaps—of all our Marceau Burgundies today—a result of this happy meeting—is our (1949) *WHITE Clos Vougeot*: brilliant, soft, wonderful bouquet. It grows in a small sector of the historic 126-acre Vougeot enclosure (Clos Vougeot), a vineyard planted mostly to the equally celebrated *red Clos Vougeot* (like our 1947). The vines of both colors are married to the magical soil—so rare and perfect a marriage that the Chevaliers du Tastevin, the great international society of professional tasters, hold their annual midsummer feast here at the chateau of the Clos.

The *Clos Vougeot white*, our Taster avers, is not to be found anywhere else in America. He says it is an experience out of this world. He says it will perform for chicken and light meats and fish miracles like those that the historic red Burgundies of the Marceau family will perform for the red meats and for game. He is a man with not only a rare sense of taste, but also the highest regard for the truth.

He says if you don't try Clos Vougeot White, 49, and stock up from the other pedigrees below, you may miss a rare treat. (The Marceau cellar is naturally

RIISING NEUTRALISM A HURDLE FOR NATO

Feeling of Less Urgency Also
Is Symptomatic of Problems
Facing West's Defense

ANTI-AMERICANISM GROWS

Teamwork Has Decreased at
SHAPE Since Eisenhower
Left as Commander

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

A growth of anti-Americanism and neutralism, and a decrease in the sense of military urgency are symptomatic of some of the current troubles faced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO's problems are the traditional ones of a coalition of allies, forged in danger, and softened by the apparent recession of that danger. Selfish and individual interests are submerged in the common interest of mutual survival when danger threatens. But today much of Europe is comforted by the façade of strength NATO has erected and with the growing belief that Russia does not mean to attack the West. Consequently, there are emerging again all the old sectionalisms, jealousies and national rivalries.

Many of the statesmen of Europe are more preoccupied with social welfare than with military security and others are more worried about what their neighbors are doing than they are about Russia. Europe simply does not take the threat of imminent war as seriously as the United States does. The relatively low state of readiness of many nations—radar warning nets manned only part of the time, divisions far below war strength, staffs and commands virtually inactivated over holidays—is an index of this difference.

The United States is far more on its toes in a military sense than any of the nations of Europe; partly because it is richer, more powerful and bigger, partly because it is already fighting a war in Korea, partly because of Pearl Harbor and the ingrained determination of its military leaders not to be caught short again, and partly because of the national temperament, but largely because the Americans have a greater sense of urgency.

The sense of urgency in Europe has definitely declined, pronouncedly so in the past year, and more so since the Communist party meeting in Moscow last October, which defined what Europe interpreted as a new Communist party line—no hot war in Europe, but intensification of the cold war with increased effort to split the Allies.

With the exception of a relatively few military men and statesmen, Europe does not believe the possibility of a general war in the near future is very great. Unlike 1937, when everyone was sure war was coming, European leaders are inclined to feel that the West faces, not general war in the foreseeable future, but an indefinite cold war.

This conflict between the military requirements of Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe, which sees the problem in the cold harsh terms of defensive capabilities, and the psychological unwillingness of most European peoples to accept the

Professor Wins Award Of Geographic Society



National Geographic Society
Dr. Harold Eugene Edgerton

WASHINGTON, Jan. 12 (AP)—The National Geographic Society today announced award of its Franklin L. Burr Prize, with a check for \$2,000, to Dr. Harold Eugene Edgerton, inventor of ultra high speed flash light equipment.

Dr. Edgerton, professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, developed the stroboscopic lights that make it possible to photograph bullets in flight, the pulse of hummingbirds' wings and the impact of a bat against a baseball.

Imminence of crisis is complicated by other problems. These include:

ANTI-AMERICANISM

There are many reasons for the increase in anti-Americanism. Communist propaganda has some but not a dominant effect. There are some residual effects, in countries dominated by left-wing Socialist governments before the war, of the ideological bias against capitalist America.

There is some natural jealousy and dislike for the "rich uncle" who provides money or gifts. As a Dutch official expressed it, "no good deed will ever remain unpunished."

There is an inferiority complex, and—particularly in France—some hidden sense of shame that expresses itself in superiority.

The gap between United States professions and United States actions alienates some Europeans, who find it difficult, for instance, to reconcile the United States' leader of a democratic crusade against Communist tyranny, with the United States of the McCarran Act and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.

There is also some deep worry about what Europeans think are United States political immaturity and hastiness.

Tactlessness on the part of some of our "eager beavers" who ride roughshod over the age-old customs and traditions of a country, and who arrogate to themselves all the knowledge on a particular subject, have sometimes hurt our relationships. "If you studied economics at Cornell you know all about it," one European commented caustically.

The presence of large numbers of United States troops in congested civilian areas of foreign cities and the high pay of Americans and their other material privileges—most Europeans—are major causes for friction.

Personal misconduct by some

men in uniform—notably in Germany, and more recently in England—often played up by the sensational European press has helped to create anti-Americanism. The imposition of the curfew in Germany and of severe court-martial punishments for several atrocious crimes has improved the situation there. In the United Kingdom, top United States commanders and British authorities have cooperated to reduce incidents and increase friendliness.

The concentration of Americans in local "colonies," like the so-called "golden ghetto" at Bonn, that are not integrated into the life of the community is another cause for criticism.

On the other hand, Europeans themselves, by charging one price for Americans and another for their own people, have tended to create ill feeling. And, as the shoe of taxation for armaments has pinched, some Europeans have tended to blame this—illogically—on the United States.

Rigid Congressional laws and executive orders, and the multiplicity of United States agencies that must pass upon every dollar of expenditure hamstring sound administration and prevent decentralization of authority. The delays in construction in France are chiefly of our making, though some of our people have tended unjustly to place the major blame on France. The diffusion of authority is such that no one is in charge, and each change and each modification has to be referred back to Washington. Other nationalities, notably the Canadians, fitted themselves to the country; we didn't.

A final reason for some anti-Americanism is that the Europeans see very clearly that our right hand often does not know what our left hand is doing. Nearly all United States agencies in Europe are vastly overstaffed, with scores of high-ranking officers and diplomats making a great show of activity, but too often mistaking that activity for accomplishment. The waste of manpower entailed and the obvious red tape involved cannot fill the European with confidence or admiration.

NEUTRALISM

There has been some increase, but not a startling one, in this sentiment. Some Europeans tend to believe that a third force can be created strong enough to stand aside from any conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, most realistic "neutralism" if it can be so called, is not so blind. It simply holds that the United States is, of necessity, the chief opponent of Russia, that if Europe is to do its part the United States must supply the equipment and the main effort, and that, in any case, each nation must have some veto power over impetuous United States actions. The latter trend is more and more apparent; for instance, the United States no longer dominates the actions of NATO.

PACIFISM AND FATALISM

This is in major part a residual tradition, derivative from generations of past neutralism, decades of socialism and anti-militarism, and expressive of the beliefs of some of Europe's smaller countries that there was no use fighting anyway, so bend to the conqueror. This tradition is a far less potent force than it was before World War II, but it dies hard and it is affecting the psychological drive behind the rearmament program, particularly in some of the smaller countries.

NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

One of the more serious voids in NATO is the psychological vacuum created by the departure of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. The President-elect, known and respected throughout Europe, supplied a personal leadership that is lacking

now. He realized that political, economic, psychological and military problems went hand in hand and tackled them all. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, his successor as Supreme Allied Commander, has stuck strictly to the military problems and resolutely refuses to deal with other problems, which he believes are the concern of the NATO Council or the foreign ministers of the countries concerned.

Though General Ridgway has demonstrated a fine knowledge of terrain and has won the respect of many of Europe's military men, he has made very little impression on the general public. Nor is Sir Bernard Brodie, the smooth-working team player under General Eisenhower, either. Lord Ismay, Secretary-General of the NATO Council, nor any other figure in NATO has supplied the dramatic and dynamic public leadership that characterized Eisenhower's period of command.

This situation is complicated by the confused and involved NATO command situation, which is in part the product of national and service rivalries. The present command structure, which is really a committee, probably would not stand the strain of war.

MILITARY MODERNIZATION

For many of the countries of Europe—particularly the allies—ones—the NATO rearmament program involves nothing less than a military revolution. Fundamental changes in the structures of governments have had to be made, ancient traditions and service rivalries overcome and long standing prejudices eliminated. Though much of this has been done on paper, the internal problems any revolution creates still persist in half a dozen countries and handicap the work of rearmament.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

These involve nearly all the nations of Europe and have had—most notably in the Italian-Yugoslav differences over Trieste—major influence upon the development of NATO military strength. The attitude of Germany, negotiations with Spain; the distrust of Northern Europe for Latin Southern Europe, and the ever pressing problems of European powers with Asiatic and African responsibilities are other major difficulties.

A key and continuing problem is the presence of strong Communist minorities—particularly in France and Italy—and a trend in some countries toward extreme and virulent nationalist movements.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

These provide the biggest single issue NATO faces, though they are closely interwoven with political and psychological issues. The problems resultant from Europe's adverse dollar balances and the artificial separation by the Iron Curtain of a formerly economically integrated continent into two worlds have not been solved. Until they are NATO military progress will be dependent primarily upon United States aid.

This is the second of five articles by the military analyst of THE NEW YORK TIMES, who just returned from a three-month survey of thirteen European countries, including all of the principal NATO nations.